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INTRODUCTION 
The international travel industry operates with in a compli-
cated regulatory framework designed to meet New Zealand's 
external civil aviation policies, and fulfil the Government's 
obligations to other states. But competition within the 
industry is strong. In order to attract business, and 
increase their share of the market, some airlines and travel 
agencies are discounting passenger fares below the levels 
approved by government. 
Apart from the possibility that such practices are illegal 
under New Zealand domestic law, to condone discounting would 
place the New Zealand Government in breach of its obliga-
tions under several bilateral and multilateral air service 
agreements with other countries. 
Discounting also has undesirable effects within the 
industry. Air lines may engage in predatory or monopolistic 
practices to the detriment of other airlines who are unable 
to compete. The State has a legitimate interest in protect-
ing the businesses of its citizens, and may even own, or 
hold an interest in, an airline itself. It is recognised 
worldwide that government intervention is needed to protect 
the industry, especially smaller business interests that 
carry little bargaining power. If the industry is not 
controlled there is a risk that an unhealthy market will 
lead to a drop in the level of safety standards. 
The New Zealand attempt to legislate in this area has been 
administratively ineffective. It has not produced effective 
control or enforcement. This paper will examine the devel-
opment of New Zealand's international obligations, and its 
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present day external civil aviation policy. The discounting 
practice will be explained, and legislation or regulations 
used to prevent it between 1947 and 1982 will be considered. 
In 1982 Parliament enacted the Civil Aviation Amendment Act 
1982 to come into force on 1 July 1983, or earlier if 
specified by the Governor-General. It was intended to 
strengthen the existing law, and provide for successful 
policing of illegal discounting. This paper will highlight 
the problems that Act was intended to remedy, and consider 
whether it has been successful. 
The present system for setting and approving international 
air fares, as introduced by the 1982 amending Act, will be 
explained. A conclusion will suggest that while the legis-
lation has provided for an effective system, that system is 
not working effectively in practice. 
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1. NEW ZEALAND'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND EXTERNAL 
CIVIL AVIATION POLICY 
The origins of governmental control in the fixing of tariffs 
and conditions for international air travel can be traced 
back as early as 1919. International civil aviation has 
traditionally been subject to extensive government control 
and regulation. Such control is not unique to New Zealand. 
Nearly every sovereign state exercises similar controls, 
and therefore New Zealand must be seen as a part of the 
entire international context. 
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The New Zealand Government is a party to a collection of 
international conventions, treaties and bilateral or multi-
lateral air service agreements that regulate travel by air 
between the party states. The Government has, therefore, 
accepted an obligation to maintain approved flights between 
the countries party to each agreement.l New Zealand's 
international obligations also require it to maintain tariffs 
approved in accordance with its air service agreements. 
Every agreement specifies the procedure and criteria for 
approving the international air fares covered by that 
ogreement.2 
Appended to this Paper is a copy of the air services agree-
ment between the Government of New Zealand and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Nauru.3 It is a typical bilateral 
air services agreement, and will be referred to throughout 
this chapter by way of illustration. As can be seen, the 
agreement deals with all matters in relation to air services 
between the two countries. Tariffs are dealt with in 
Article 10. 
The New Zealand Government meets its obligations under this 
and other agreements by strictly regulating all airlines 
that operate in to or out of New Zealand. Control is 
comprehensive and regulates most aspects of an airline's 
operation, not merely tariffs. 
The starting point, or reason why such agreements are 
necessary, is the sovereignty vested in all states which 
gives them the right to exercise absolute control over their 
territory and airspace. Landing rights, or rights of 
airspace transit, are a partial derogation of sovereignty 
and must be bargained for. Thus, governments bargain for 
such rights at an international level on behalf of airlines 
or other organisations domiciled in their country. The 
whole framework of international civil aviation has 
developed from this concept. 
There are also wider motives. The jealous protection of 
sovereign rights in airspace would not only prevent the 
operation of all international aviation,4 but would also 
have adverse effects on a country's economy. International 
civil aviation provides tourism, and has major implications 
on a country's entire sphere of international political 
interests and import/export trade relations. 
In negotiating with other countries on bilateral air 
transport agreements decisions are generally based upon 
commercial considerations. The Government, in consultation 
with Air New Zealand, assesses the need for a new service 
within the context of existing and potential markets. 5 
Alternatively, landing rights may be granted for some other 
favour, or withdrawn as a political sanction.6 
In return for landing rights in one country, reciprocal 
rights will generally be granted in the other, even if they 
are not immediately used. The agreement with Nauru provides 
an example of this. By Article 3, and the schedule to the 
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agreement, it will be seen that equal rights are conferred 
on both parties, yet Air New Zealand has never operated a 
service to Nauru. 
There have been a great number of international conferences 
and agreements on civil aviation. Often the policies of 
powerful countries have differed and this has resulted in 
smaller countries such as New Zealand being subject to com-
peting tensions and influences. 
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After the Second World War the United States was in a 
fortunate and powerful position owing to its large resources. 
It had many surplus large aircraft, and many surplus war 
pilots. It could lead the world in passenger transportation 
and sought wide freedom of capacity to regulate. 
The British did not have the same resources but did have 
control or influence over a large empire throughout the 
world. Landing rights in a great many desirable destina-
tions were in the hands of the British. These factors gave 
each country a position of strength, and led to trade-offs 
and agreements between them. They were together in a posi-
tion to dictate to the rest of the world how international 
civil aviation would develop. 
The Chicago International Civil Aviation Conference of 19447 
developed regulatory agreements and conceptualised the 
manner in which states could derogate from their sovereign 
positions.8 The agreement with Nauru recognises the Chicago 
Convention of 1944, and states in its preamble 
.... BEING PARTIES to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation opened for 
signature at Chicago on the seventh day 
of December 1944; 
DESIRING to conclude an Agreement, supp-
lementary to the said Convention, for the 
purpose of establishing air services be-
tween their respective territories 
HAVE AGREED as follows .... 
Article 2 states -
The provisions of this Agreement shall be 
subject to the provisions of the [1944 
Chicago Convention] and to the provisions 
of any other multilateral convention that 
is binding on both Contracting Parties in 
so far as those provisions are applicable 
to international air services. 
From the Chicago Conference the 'five freedoms of the air' 
emerged. They are - 9 
TRANSIT RIGHTS 
First Freedom: Right of transit without landing. 
Second Freedom: Right of non-traffic stop for re-
fuelling, etc., but not setting 
down or picking up load. 
TRAFFIC RIGHTS (Based on an international 
airline domiciled in nation "A") 
Third Freedom: Right to set down traffic from 
nation "A" at nation "B". 
Fourth Freedom: Right to pick up traffic from 
nation "B" for nation "A". 
Fifth Freedom: Right to carry traffic between 
foreign countries, e.g. nation 
"B" and nation "C". 
Also developed was the right of 'cabotage', the right to 
carry traffic within the territory of a foreign nation, e.g: 
between two cities in nation "B". 
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Article 3 of the Agreement with Nauru deals with the 
granting of such rights. Article 3(1) (a) grants to each 
party by the other party "the right to fly across its 
territory without landing" (first freedom). Article 
3(1) (b) grants each party by the other party "the right to 
make stops in its territory for non-traffic purposes" 
(second freedom,. By Article 3(2) each party is granted 
third and fourth freedoms necessary to establish an air 
service on the routes specified in the schedule to the 
Agreement. The routes in the schedule to the Agreement do 
specify intermediate stops in other countries not party to 
the Agreement. This would, of course, be subject to 
agreement with those other countries and this fifth 
freedom of the air in relation to a Nauru-Auckland or 
Auckland-Nauru flight would not be available until the 
intermediate country had agreed to the picking up or 
discharge of passengers within its territory. By Article 
3(3) the right of cabotage is expressly denied. 
The Bermuda Agreement of 1946 (Bermuda 1)10 was a bilateral 
agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Its formula provided a means of regulating the freedoms of 
the air and its principles were adopted by many countries 
for incorporation into most bilateral air service 
agreements. It is still used today in some agreements. 
Under the Bermuda 1 formula fares were to be agreed upon by 
the airlines in accordance with resolutions or decisions of 
the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The 
fares would then be filed for approval with the two 
governments at each end of the route. This is called the 
'mutual approval' method of setting tariffs. Both 
governments have to approve of a particular fare or else 
it will not come into existence. All agreements involving 
the United States or Britain were on this basis. 
That position has now changed. Since the 1970's there has 
been an increased demand by consumers for cheaper 
international air travel. This demand has not been easy 
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to satisfy since it has come at a time when steep increases 
in operating costs, notably fuel, have pushed many airlines 
dangerously close to economic disaster. 
Australia and the United States are New Zealand's major 
international air travel markets and their responses to the 
problem have been diametrically opposed, although both aim 
at generating more traffic, and achieving lower fares. 
Thus, New Zealand found itself stuck between two very 
different and conflicting policies. The New Zealand 
Government had to decide whether the demand for cheaper 
fares would best be satisfied through government control, or 
market forces.11 
The United States totally changed its earlier approach and 
deregulated its industry in 1978. It saw less government 
control and open competition as the best way of eliminating 
inefficiency, improving services, and lowering fares.12 
Under the United States system, competitive market forces 
will determine fares, and government intervention will be 
the minimum necessary to - 13 
1. Prevent predatory or discriminatory prices or 
practices (e.g: action taken by one airline 
prepared to sacrifice current revenues with the 
specific intention of driving rivals from the 
market so that higher profits can be earned in the 
long run in the absence of competition). 
2. Protect consumers from prices that are unduly high 
or restrictive because of the abuse of monopoly 
power. 
3. Protect airlines from prices that are artificially 
low because of direct or indirect government 
subsidy or support. 
Rather than the mutual approval method of approving 
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fares, which allows foreign governments some control over 
fares charged in the United States by withholding approval 
of a particular fare, the United States Government in its 
bilateral air service agreements now prefers the following 
methods of tariff control -
1. 'Mutual disapproval' - unless both governments 
disapprove of a particular fare filed by an air-
line that fare will come into force. In practice 
this does not differ significantly from mutual 
approval. This method is, in fact, rarely used 
by the United States, its preferred method being -
2. 'Country of Origin' - a government can intervene 
in the fare charged for a particular route, but 
only in relation to the price charged within its 
own country, i.e: it has no control over the fare 
offered in the other country for the same route. 
Such clauses allow for unilateral control, but 
only in relation to tickets sold within a 
government's own territory. 
The Australian Government decided on strict government 
control. It saw restrictions on competition, with strict 
control over the industry and conditions of travel, as the 
most effective way of lowering fares while still 
maintaining acceptable economic returns for the airlines. 
In its bilateral air service agreements Australia retained 
the mutual approval method of fare approval, except in its 
agreements with the United States. 
Both those countries put pressure on New Zealand to adopt 
their approach. In 1979 it was considered appropriate to 
re-evaluate New Zealand's external aviation policy and a 
comprehensive White Paper was presented to Parliament on 
that subject.14 It sets out New Zealand's international 
aviation goals and policy, and outlines the pricing 
principles that should be taken into account in achieving 
those goals. 
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The White Paper stated that for New Zealand there would be 
difficulties with both the United States and Australian 
approaches. The Paper states, at page 45, that -
The [United States approach] restricts 
access to its total aviation market but 
wishes to deregulate fares and capacity 
between the United States and other 
markets while the [Australian approach] 
wishes to control all aspects of air 
carriage. 
New Zealand chose a regulated market, although it is 
intended to be flexible and pragmatic. In the New Zealand 
agreements with the United States tariffs are approved on a 
country of origin approach. With other countries fares are 
approved within a Bermuda 1 mutual approval framework, but 
any method may be used, depending on the particular 
situation and negotiations. A survey of three of the most 
recent agreements negotiated shows that in practice New 
Zealand is adopting mutual approval systems, although the 
agreements all contain different manifestations of that 
model depending on the particular circumstances of an 
agreement.15 
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It should be noted that the Hon. Mr. Neilson, M.P., considers 
that the Australian regulated market has now collapsed and 
that there is great pressure for deregulation in that 
country.16 Whether or not that is true it has not had a 
similar effect on the New Zealand market which remains 
regulated. 
The objectives of New Zealand's external aviation policy are 
set out at page 30 of the White Paper. They are -
(a) To enable the development of a network 
of adequate, efficient and competitive 
air services between New Zealand and 
other countries to provide travel, 
trade and corrununication links at a 
level, at a price, and of a type con-
sonant with New Zealand's needs; 
(b) To serve New Zealand's political, 
strategic, and economic interests; 
(c) To maintain the highest possible degree 
of safety and security in international 
air transportation; 
(d) To maximise the contribution of interna-
tional air transport services to the 
growth of net foreign exchange earnings; 
(e) To pursue policies that encourage the 
availability of air services to and from 
New Zealand, which best meet the aims 
of ( a) , ( b) , ( c) , and { d) above . 
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Within the context of certain existing multilateral 
agreements,17 bilateral air service agreements will continue 
to be negotiated with other countries to meet these external 
aviation objectives. Air rights will not be limited as a 
matter of principle, but will achieve the best balance 
between corrunercial factors, economic considerations and 
political concerns.18 The approach to negotiations will be 
flexible and pragmatic. 
In designing a regulatory framework the Government wanted a 
reasonably competitive environment. Tourism is not best 
served by stringent controls. However, it is seen as 
desirable to maintain the New Zealand national carrier so in 
some instances Air New Zealand may need protection against 
unfair competition from other airlines.19 
The White Paper states, at page 43, that the principles upon 
which passenger fares and associated conditions are based 
should be in line with the policy goals stated earlier. The 
Paper lists, also at page 43, six factors relevant to 
pricing, viz -
(a) Prices should be at the lowest level 
consistent with free play of market 
forces, maintaining a high standard 
of safety and providing an adequate 
return to efficient airlines; 
(b) Prices should be based on the least cost 
at which safe and efficient services can 
be provided at reasonable load factors; 
(c) Prices should take into account differ-
ences in convenience and quality of 
service offered; 
(d) Prices should reflect competitive market 
forces and meet competition; 
(e) Prices should be designed to enlarge the 
market and increase demand; 
(f) Prices should not involve unjust discrim-
ination, or undue pre fe renc e or adv an tag e. 
It is now appropriate to discuss the tariff setting system 
in the air services agreement between New Zealand and 
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Nauru. It is provided in Article 10 of the Agreement. 
Article 10(4) provides that whenever possible tariffs should 
be agreed upon by the airlines concerned. The agreed tariff 
is then subject to the approval of both governments, who in 
their consideration of the proposed tariff are expected to 
have due regard to the provisions of paragraph (2) of 
Article 10. Thus, it is a mutual approval system. 
Paragraph (2) provides that -
The tariffs on any agreed service shall 
be establishedd at reasonable levels, 
due regard being paid to all relevant 
factors including cost of operation, 
reasonable profit, characteristics of 
the service (such as standards of 
speed and accorrunodation) and the 
tariffs of other airlines. 
Therefore, paragraph (2) lays down a small number of 
fairly general policy factors. It does not mirror the 
policy objectives or pricing principles set out in the New 
Zealand White Paper of 1979. 20 Presumably this is so as 
not to bind the Government of Nauru who may have different 
policy goals. It is left to domestic legislation to ensure 
that the New Zealand tariff approving machinery has due 
regard to New Zealand external civil aviation policy. 
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The question that now arises is as to an effective system of 
domestic regulatory control. The New Zealand Government is 
bound at an international level by a large number of 
multilateral and bilateral air service agreements. There 
must be legislation in New Zealand to ensure compliance by 
all those involved in the international travel industry so 
that international obligations are not breached. 
In addition, the New Zealand Government wishes its external 
aviation policy objectives and pricing principles to be 
observed in the approval of tariffs. A system of regulatory 
control should meet the international obligations and policy 
goals, but be flexible enough to adapt to market forces. 
The New Zealand system of regulatory control is the subject 
of discussion in Parts 3 and 4 of this Paper. 
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2. THE DISCOUNTING PRACTICE 
It is submitted that discounting of international passenger 
fares is widespread throughout the travel industry in New 
Zealand. The techniques are varied, but the aim remains the 
same - to offer a lower fa re than that approved by 
governments, and supposedly charged by other travel 
retailers or wholesalers, in order to attract custom. 
The Minister of Civil Aviation and Meteorological Services21 
called this a "self-defeating market malpractice".22 He 
said, when introducing the Civil Aviation Amendment Act 
1982 - 23 
The international airline industry is 
currently suffering a worldwide downturn. 
[In 1981] members of the International 
Air Transport Association - IATA - lost 
US$2.l billion on their international 
operations ... In order to increase their 
share of the market, some airlines have 
resorted to discounting passenger fares 
... below the levels approved by govern-
ments. While these airlines may gain an 
initial advantage over their competitors, 
other air lines feel obliged to match the 
discounts to preserve their own share of 
the market. The net result is that all 
airlines have ended up with less revenue 
for traffic that they would probably have 
carried anyway. IATA has estimated that 
these self-defeating market malpractices 
will cost its members about US$1 billion 
[in 198 2]. 
The Minister talks only of airlines but the same principles 
apply to all those in the industry. In the Auck land suburb 
of Takapuna there are eleven travel retailers within a small 
15 
shopping area of no greater radius than one kilometre. 
Competition is fierce. One agency engages very frequently 
in air fare discounting. Others do so less frequently. 
Nearly all travel agents knowingly engage in a practice that 
is in fact illegal, but because that practice is so 
widespread, the travel agent believes it to be legitimate. 
Those businesses that do not wish to discount suffer as a 
result of those that do. It is probable that many 
businesses would rather not discount, but are forced to, so 
as not to lose business. In 1982 the Bank of New Zealand 
expanded its operations by establishing a travel representa-
tive within its Takapuna Branch. Marketing of this service 
was comprehensive and well planned, but it is the policy of 
the Bank of New Zealand not to engage in any form of illegal 
air fare discounting. Since establishment business has been 
slow, and in part the Bank attributes this to its lack of 
competitiveness. The operation may not have survived were 
its initial losses not able to be absorbed into the larger 
resources of BNZ Travel. The poor response is considered 
to be a result of some retailers in the Takapuna area 
offering cheaper fares, or other inducements, to travellers. 
It is apparent that travellers are willing to 'shop around' 
for the lowest fare. Travellers may be loyal to a certain 
agent for various reasons, but it has never been observed 
that travellers avoid agents that discount for fear of being 
involved in an illegal fare arrangement. Furthermore, it is 
submitted, the majority of travellers would not be aware 
that an arrangement entered into may be illega1.24 
Techniques that are commonly used to discount travel below 
approved tariffs are -
1. The direct offer of a cheaper fare. This is the most 
common method and appears in many different forms, some 
simple, others involving complicated business procedures. A 
retailer may be willing to forego part of his commission and 
pass the saving on to the traveller. Decreasing profits in 
this manner in an industry with high overheads could be 
dangerous. 
The greatest amount of discounting is done by arrangement 
with a wholesaler or with the carrying airline. These 
organisations can offer discounts by selling package, or 
bulk, travel. In 1982 a small survey was conducted in 
Wellington on the range of prices available. For a fare 
from Wellington to Kuala Lumpur inquirers obtained 
quotes between $1,250 and $2,00o.25 Also in 1982 it was 
alleged that a well known airline was carrying passengers 
from Australia to the United States at a vastly discounted 
rate that would return only $12 per seat, or nothing if 
there was a delay in trave1.26 The ticket may or may not 
bear the correct fare on its face. 
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2. A traveller agrees to pay the approved fare initially, and 
is ticketed accordingly. Upon his return to New Zealand, or 
upon arrival at his foreign destination, or at some other 
time, the traveller receives a cheque by way of refund for 
the negotiated discount. This is the procedure referred to 
earlier that is so widespread most travel agents believe it 
to be legitimate. 
It was alleged in 1982 that a well known airline was paying 
$40.00 per head to New Zealanders from Singapore from an 
external bank account unknown to the Reserve Bank.27 There 
have also been reports of instances in Auckland where far 
greater refunds were negotiated and paid in this manner. 
3. A traveller pays the approved tariff but receives other 
benefits such as an increased level of in-flight service, 
discounts on accommodation or food, or sightseeing trips. 
It has been reported that New Zealand travellers are being 
offered very cheap accommodation in luxury overseas hotels 
if they travel on a certain airline. It was cynically 
suggested the next step might be that airline "X" will pay 
travellers to stay in a top Honolulu hotel free, as long as 
they fly there on airline "X".28 
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It was stated that over Christmas of 1983 Air New Zealand, 
by arrangement with loyal tour operators, was offering sto-
pover accommodation in Hawaii and Disneyland at a rate of 
$59.00 for seven nights. The package included other induce-
ments, such as a free "lei" around the neck in Honolulu, 
free transfers between airport and hotel, free breakfasts, 
etc. 29 
Caught unawares, other airlines offered similar arrange-
ments. Continental Airlines matched Air New Zealand's 
$59.00 rate, but started work on a cheaper package. Pan 
American Airlines offered a seven night Honolulu package at 
$49.00. The cheapest arrangement of all was a deal through 
Worldwide Air Travel Ltd. It offered accommodation for 
$1.00 per night at good hotels in Los Angeles and Singapore 
for travellers flying Air New Zealand, Pan American, or 
British Airways. Since no one can buy a hotel bed in 
Honolulu, Los Angeles or Singapore for $1.00, or even $7.00, 
a night, in most cases the airlines concerned must be 
heavily subsidising such accommodation, thus cutting into 
returns obtained from the air fares.30 In some cases the 
subsidy may be less. The airline may own the hotel, or 
both the hotel and the airline may sell space at a low rate 
to mutually assist each other's operation. 
4. Travel via a non-approved route or service. There are 
many alternative routes to a given destination and it may be 
cheaper to circumvent the Ministry of Transport with a more 
circuitous route.31 
It has been reported that a traveller could fly from 
Auckland to Los Angeles via Fiji on Air Pacific for $898, 
against the Air New Zealand approved fare of $1,323. Air 
Pacific's Fiji-Los Angeles fare is not on the Ministry of 
Transport's record of approved fares, but it could be 
purchased in Auckland.32 
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5. There are many cheaper fares sold in overseas countries. 
They may be legal or illegal in terms of that country's 
law. A traveller on a long journey may save money by 
purchasing only the initial leg of the trip, say as far as 
Australia, in New Zealand. He pays his travel agent in New 
Zealand the appropriate sum of money for the remaining legs 
and is given a Miscellaneous Charges Order (M.C.O.). The 
M.C.O. is presented to a retailer overseas and is conver-
tible into onward air tickets. This practice is illegal, as 
will be shown in Part 4 of this Paper. 
It has been suggested that at one stage a traveller could 
get from Honolulu to London for a week at a price of 
$39.0o.33 Extremely cheap airfares are available in 
countries such as Holland and Greece. 
3. REGULATORY CONTROL IN NEW ZEALAND PRIOR TO THE CIVIL 
AVIATION AMENDMENT ACT 1982. 
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In the early days of international civil aviation air fare 
discounting was not a recognisable problem. Under most air 
service agreements, as explained earlier, fares were agreed 
upon between airlines, in the context of I.A.T.A. resolu-
tions, and submitted to governments for approval. Airlines 
had sufficient input into the fare setting process and were 
generally content. Air fare discounting, as a major problem, 
emerged in the 1970's as economic difficulties forced airli-
nes to compete, not only to avoid bankruptcy, but to meet 
the public demand for lower fares. 
Up until 1978, had it been necessary, action could have been 
taken against a discounting airline under the provisions of 
the International Air Services Licensing Act 1947. However, 
it was the aim of that Act to provide for the issue of air 
service licences, not to regulate tariffs. An analysis of 
the provisions of the Act gives rise to the following list 
of reasons for its unsuitability as a vehicle for tariff 
control -
1. By section 9(1) the Minister may grant a licence to 
operate an air service subject to such conditions as he 
thinks fit. By section 9(2) (f) the Minister, in granting 
any licence, may prescribe the fares to be charged for the 
carriage of passengers. By section 16(1) the Minister may 
at any time appoint a person to hold an inquiry as to 
whether or not any international air service is being 
carried on in conformity with the terms and conditions of 
the licence. 
If the Minister is satisfied that the licensee is not 
carrying on the service in conformity with the licence (for 
example, fares are being discounted below those prescribed 
under section 9(2) (f)) the operator's air service licence 
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may be revoked,34 or suspended for a period.35 Revocation 
or suspension of an airline's operating licence was seen as 
too severe as a sanction against discounting.36 Without a 
licence an airline cannot operate that route.37 The airline 
may have to lay off staff, and business lost may be never 
recovered. As well as being out of proportion to the 
offence, revocation or suspension of an air services licence 
could have bilateral repercussions for the government under 
its air service agreement with the country at the other end 
of tb e route concerned. 
2. The only other sanction that could be imposed in respect 
of non-compliance with the terms of an international air 
services licence was a small fine.38 A small fine is no 
deterrent to a large airline. 
3. The Act deals only with air lines. It does not provide 
for any control over travel agents or other people in the 
industry, except by creating an offence and imposing a small 
fine where such a person does an act in relation to an air 
service as agent for the air line concerned where there is no 
licence in force. 39 There is no offence by an agent in 
respect of a breach of a condition of an air services 
licence in force, and held by an air line. 
4. The Act controls international air services. The defi-
nition of 'international air service' in section 2 of the 
Act does not include travel between two locations outside 
New Zealand, with no stops in New Zealand, where such travel 
is arranged and paid for in New Zealand. It is the aim of 
the government to subject such travel to the same regulation 
as all other travel purchased in New Zealand. 
The provisions of the International Air Services Licensing 
Act 1947 do not cater for the extensive regulation needed in 
the control of tariffs. To amend this Act for that purpose 
would involve a major re-drafting of many of its sections. 
The changes desired were more easily made by amending the 
Civil Aviation Act 1964. All control of tariffs is now 
exercised pursuant to the Civil Aviation Act, its 
amendments, and subordinate legislation made under it. 
In the mid to late 1970's illegal air fare discounting had 
become a major problem. The International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (I.C.A.O) called upon member states to adopt 
enforcement procedures to curb and eliminate illegal 
discounting. As a result most countries now have some form 
of compliance machinery for the enforcement of approved 
tariffs. New Zealand's response to the I.C.A.O. call, as 
stated above, was to amend the Civil Aviation Act 1964 to 
enable the introduction of the International Air Tariff 
Regulations 1978.40 
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The Civil Aviation Act 1964 had an extensive regulation 
making section,41 but neither that empowering provision, nor 
the Act itself, specifically dealt with the control of 
tariffs. Section 5 of the Civil Aviation Amendment Act 1976 
extended section 29 of the principal Act so as to give wide 
powers to promulgate regulations for the control of air fares 
sold for travel between New Zealand and any place outside 
New Zealand. Also authorised was the creation by regulation 
of offences for non-compliance, and the imposition on 
offenders of fines not exceeding $5,000.00. 
The Civil Aviation Amendment Act 1977 by section 3 further 
amended the principal Act by extending the regulation making 
power to include not just control of tariffs for carriage 
between New Zealand and places outside New Zealand, but also 
where carriage is purchased, sold, or arranged in New 
Zealand, for travel between places outside New Zealand. 
Pursuant to these powers, the International Air Tariff 
Regulations 1978 were promulgated on 24 January 1978. They 
were notified in the Gazette on 26 January 1978 42 and came 
into force twenty-eight days later on 23 February 1978.43 
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Under these Regulations control and approval of tariffs was 
exercised by the Secretary for Transport. His main powers 
were contained in Regulation 4. By Regulation 4(1), any 
person could submit a tariff, or an amendment to an approved 
tariff to the Secretary for his approval. The Secretary 
could approve or refuse to approve any tariff or amendment 
submitted to him. 
In approving a tariff the Secretary could approve it in 
whole or in part, or even approve it in a form varied by 
him. 4 4 The Secretary could, of his own motion, at any time 
direct that an approved tariff be amended in any specified 
way.45 In addition the Secretary had a discretion, at any 
time, to withdraw his approval of an approved tariff, or 
part of an approved tariff.46 
Regulation 5 directed that in the exercise of his powers 
under Regulation 4 the Secretary should have regard to cer-
tain matters. They included any relevant international con-
vention, agreement or arrangement to which the Government of 
New Zealand is a party, and any relevant resolution or deci-
sion of the I.C.A.O. or I.A.T.A. that has been approved by 
the Minister. 
Regulation 3 provided for adherence to approved tariffs. 
By paragraph (1) it was provided -
... no person shall sell, arrange, or 
provide, or undertake or advertise 
his ability or willingness to sell, 
arrange, or provide, any interna-
tional carriage by air not in accord-
ance with an approved tariff. 
Paragraph (4) deemed international carriage by air not to be 
in accordance with a tariff if -
... there is advertised, offered, given, 
paid, provided, or allowed, in connec-
tion therewith, by or to any person 
whomsoever, any reward, payment, bonus, 
gift, prize, rebate, commission, dis-
count, in-flight service, allowance, 
or other benefit whatsoever -
(a) Not specified in the tariff; or 
(b) Otherwise than subject to the 
conditions ... specified in the 
tariff ... 
Paragraph (5) provided that any person who acted in contra-
vention of or failed to comply with Regulation 3 committed 
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an offence, and was liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding 
$5,000.00. 
It is interesting to note that Regulation 3(6) provided a 
defence to a charge brought under Regulation 3 if -
... the defendant shows that he neither 
knew that the international carriage by 
air concerned was not in accordance with 
an approved tariff nor had any reasonable 
means of ascertaining whether or not that 
carriage was in accordance with an approved 
tariff. 
Generally, ignorance of the law is no excuse, and it is unu-
sual to find such a provision. The writer believes that 
this was a recognition by the GovernMeV\+ of one of the 
biggest problems in the then, and in the present, system of 
regulatory control. That problem is that there is no orga-
nised system of advising all people in the travel industry 
of approved tariffs. There are many relevant publications, 
including the principal Act, Regulations, Gazette notices, 
the 'Overseas Airline Guide', the 'A.B.C.of World Travel', Air 
New Zealand's 'Agents' Advice', and other airline manuals. 
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Approved tariffs are constantly changing and because the 
system cannot adapt to this, some protection was needed for 
innocent breaches of the Regulations. 
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It should be the responsibility of the Government to provide 
reasonable means of ascertaining approved tariffs .47 
Regulation 6 provided that all air travel organisers were 
required to keep records relating to all international tra-
vel by air organised by them, for a period of two years 
after that travel was completed. The records required to 
be kept were extensive, and could together provide a 
complete audit trail should it be necessary to investigate a 
suspicious travel arrangement. 
Regulation 7 provided search and seizure provisions. Any 
person authorised in writing by the Secretary could -
(a) Inspect the records of any air travel 
organiser: 
(b) Require any person to make available to 
him for inspection all records relating 
to any matter specified in regulation 
6 ( 1) ••• 
(c) Take copies of or extracts from any 
records relating to any matters 
specified in regulation 6 (1) ... 
'Records' was defined in Regulation 2. It was an inclusive 
rather than an exhaustive definition. It appears that 
Regulation 7(a) therefore allowed the inspection of all of 
an organisation's records, not just those relating to mat-
ters specified in Regulation 6(1). However, the taking of 
copies or extracts of records is limited by Regulation 7 (c) 
to those relating to matters specified in Regulation 6 (1). 
Regulation 8 provided for further offences not covered by 




PROBLEMS WITH THE REGULATORY CONTROL, AND THE CHANGES 
INTRODUCED BY THE CIVIL AVIATION AMENDMENT ACT 1982. 
The Problems with the 1978 Regulations. 
By 1981 it was clear that a new system of control was 
needed. It had been hoped by the Minister that the 
existence of the 1978 Regulations, along with self-policing 
by airlines and travel agents, would be sufficient to tidy 
up the market-place in New Zealand without recourse to 
prosecutions. 4 8 
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However, that was not to be the case. The Hon. Mr. Neilson, 
M.P., said "that to ask the airline industry to enforce air 
ticket discounting was like putting Al Capone in charge of 
enforcing prohibition. 1149 Discounting was widespread and 
the industry was calling for effective control from the 
Government. It was obvious that positive enforcement by 
way of prosecution was needed, so the Ministry appointed a 
small number of investigative officers and began to gather 
evidence. 
It was then discovered that the existing Regulations were 
defective and that prosecutions were not likely to succeed. 
The reasons why a prosecution would not succeed were given 
to Parliament by the Minister as -
1. . .. the various commissions payable by airlines to 
travel agents turned out to have a greater bearing on 
the mechanics of discounting than had been envisaged 
when the original empowering legislation was drafted.SO 
2. . .. the complex relationships between airlines, agents, 
sub-agents, overseas travel organisers, and customers, 
meant that it could prove difficult to provide a court 
with sufficiently compelling evidence to convict 
any particular person or organisation of an 
offence.51 
3 It was a "difficult matter on which to get 
evidence."52 
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Thus, there was never a prosecution taken under the 1978 
Regulations. Despite what the Minister said it is submitted 
that the blame for this cannot be placed wholly on the 
Regulations, but must be laid partly at the door of the 
Ministry. The main problem was that the Ministry never came 
up with an organised list of approved tariffs. It was very 
difficult, under the 1978 Regulations, to establish exactly 
what was the approved fare for a given route on a given 
date. Where an officially approved tariff existed there 
was no organised system of promulgation. There was no 
system for the updating of altered tariffs. Where there was 
no statement of approved tariff in respect of a particular 
route, establishing the fare required a detailed analysis 
and interpretation of a great number of documents or 
publications. 
Because of this uncertainty, it would be easy for a defen-
dant to avail himself of the defence offered by Regulation 
3(6), and show that he neither knew, nor had reasonable 
means of ascertaining, that the carriage was not in accor-
dance with an approved tariff. 
It is submitted that where an airline had sought and 
obtained an approved tariff, the 1978 Regulations would have 
supported a conviction against that airline subsequently 
discounting the fare. They could not claim they did not 
know the approved tariff. It is submitted that persons with 
accounting experience, upon examination of a travel organi-
ser's records, would not find the airline commission 
scheme, nor the industry's complex relationships, a barrier 
to establishing what price a customer had paid and whether 
it was less than the approved tariff. 
The Minister's claim that evidence was hard to obtain is a 
direct contradiction to what he had at other times said in 
Parliament, for example - 53 
Investigations by the Ministry of Transport 
uncovered clear evidence that a small number 
of major carriers serving New Zealand were 
openly flouting the law. 
It is believed that prosecutions were not initiated where 
evidence existed, because the Ministry recognised that its 
systems were incomplete and out of line with the Minister's 
promises to the Industry. A prosecution may have looked 
'unfair'. 
B. The Civil Aviation Amendment Act 1982. 
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The Civil Aviation Amendment Act 198254 revoked the 
International Air Tariff Regulations 1978,55 and repealed 
those parts of the existing regulation making power in the 
principal Act that authorised regulations in respect of air 
tariffs.5 6 Section 2(1) of the amending Act added a large 
new section 29A to the principal Act, which now provides the 
authority for all subordinate legislation in respect of the 
approval and control of international air tariffs. It was 
intended to remedy the defects in the previous system so as 
to provide for effective control and enforcement. In addi-
tion, the amending Act provided an opportunity to change and 
better organize the scheme of regulatory control to bring it 
in line with the goals set out in the 1979 White Paper on 
New Zealand's external civil aviation policy. 
Whilst it was the opinion of the writer that some prosecu-
tions could have been successful under the 1978 
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Regulations, there is no doubt that t~e 1982 amending Act 
is a vast improvement, at least on paper. Regulation is now 
far more detailed. A system of tariff approval and pro-
mulgation has been provided for, although it is not yet in 
effective operation. 
According to the Controller of Air Services Policy one of 
the major aims of the Ministry is to achieve equality.57 A 
problem with illegal discounting in New Zealand is that cheap 
fares are available to only a small number of travellers, 
usually in Auckland. A traveller can find that the person 
in the seat next to him has paid less money for the same 
journey. Travel agents are also disadvantaged through not 
having access to cheaper fares that an airline only offers 
through some travel consortiums. 
The Ministry is, therefore, not so much concerned with the 
dollar amount of a particular fare. Its concerns are that 
only approved fares are sold, that the approved fares comply 
with bilateral obligations, meet the policy objectives, and 
are all available to every New Zealander in every town in 
New Zealand. The Ministry even discourages student fares, 
youth fares, or other discrimination between various sectors 
of the public, in the belief that all sectors of the public 
should have equal access to the widest range of fares.SS To 
the criticism that New Zealanders are being discriminated 
against by not having access to cheap fares available 
overseas, the Ministry responds - 59 
Each Government is responsible for 
doing its job in the market in which it 
has jurisdiction. It is the New Zealand 
Government's responisiblity to ensure that 
fair pricing practices apply in New 
Zealand .... If a matter is out of hand 
in another part of the world, there is no 
reason why we should be a party to allow-
ing the same matter to get out of hand in 
New Zealand. 
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This desire for equality is not expressed in the legisla-
tion. It is, however, how the Ministry intends to work 
within its discretion. The writer believes that the only 
way to achieve the desired equality is not to threaten 
airlines with sanctions, but to show the airlines that their 
desire for a cheaper fare can be satisfied legally. In the 
past the system of tariff approval has been so slow and 
restrictive that airlines have bypassed it with illegal, or 
unapproved, cheaper fares. This results in the inequality 
mentioned above. 
But if the system is seen to be quick, and available to 
approve what an airline wants, subject only to compliance 
with bilateral obligations and policy goals, airlines will 
have faith in the system and realise that there is no need 
to discount illegally. This will satisfy everybody con-
cerned. The Ministry will be satisfied that bilateral obli-
gations are met. New Zealand's external aviation policy 
goals will be met. The airlines will be satisfied, and 
most important of all - the New Zealand traveller will be 
satisfied because he will be sure when buying travel that 
the fare he is paying is the cheapest available, and that 
anyone buying the same journey, in New Zealand, w i 11 be 
paying the same. 
The indications are that the Ministry agrees with this view. 
A spokesman has said that the system will be quicker, airli-
nes will have more control over fares, and that the Minister 
will lend a sympathetic ear to any request for a new fare, 
or an amendment to an existing fare.60 
(1) The new system 
Responsibility for control and approval of tariffs is now 
exercised by the Minister of Transport, and not the 
Secretary for Transport as was the case under the 1978 
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Regulations. When the Bill was introduced to Parliament the 
Secretary for Transport had been placed in control, but the 
Labour Opposition persuaded the Government at the Select 
Committee stage that such control would offend against a 
1980 report of the Statutes Revision Committee.61 That 
report found it undesirable that a government official, who 
is not answerable to Parliament, can by his own order create 
criminal offences, or promulgate wide and extensive tertiary 
legislation. 
The Act came into force on l July 1983. For the present 
purposes, the most important term used in the new section 
29A is 'relevant tariff'. By section 29A(3) it is provided 
that -
... no person who is engaged ... in the 
business of arranging, providing, or 
selling international carriage by air 
(whether as principal, agent, sub-agent, 
or otherwise howsoever) shall arrange, 
provide, or sell any international 
carriage by air otherwise than in accor-
dance with the relevant tariff. 
By section 29A(4) it is further provided that -
... no person shall undertake, or adver-
tise his ability or willingness, to 
arrange, provide, or sell international 
carriage by air that, if arranged, 
provided, or sold in accordance with 
the undertaking or advertisement con-
cerned, would be arranged, provided, 
or sold otherwise than in accordance 
with the relevant tariff. 
It is therefore the relevant tariff that must be complied 
with. Definitions are provided by section 29A(l2). A 
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'relevant tariff' 1s comprised of a 'specific tariff' and 
applicable 'general tariff conditions'. In the absence of a 
'specific tariff' the 'relevant tariff' is to be calculated 
or ascertained from the 'fare pricing rules'. 
'Specific tariffs' are statements specifying all fares, 
rates and charges applicable to a particular route. They 
also lay down conditions that are to apply to international 
carriage by air on that route, and which of the 
tariff conditions' are to apply to that route. 
'general 
Spee if ic 
tariffs are issued by the Minister and notified in the New 
Zealand Gazette in accordance with section 29A(2). The 
first of these appeared on 30 September 1983.62 It 
specified the fare and conditions applicable to first class 
travel between New Zealand and London and expired on 30 
November 1983. The next specific tariff issued was on 14 
October 1983.63 It allowed certain cheap fares between New 
Zealand and Australian destinations, and expired on 9 
December 1983. 
What is needed is a comprehensive list of specific tariffs 
for all desinations in the world. The first part of this 
appeared on 14 June 1984.64 It lists specific tariffs to 
thirty-two European destinations.65 
'General tariff conditions' are defined as a statement of 
the conditions subject to which fares, rates, and charges, 
specified in specific tariffs are generally to be payable 
for international carriage by air. They are issued by the 
Governor-General under section 29A(l), and were notified in 
the Gazette on 30 March 1984 to come into force on 16 April 
1984. 66 There are some 123 separate conditions available 
for inclusion in specific tariffs. They do not apply to a 
particular route unless expressed to apply to that route's 
specific tariff. 
In the absence of a specific tariff the relevant tariff is 
to be calculated or ascertained from the 'fare pricing 
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rules'. They are defined as being a statement of rules for 
calculating or ascertaining fares, rates, and charges, for 
international carriage by air that are not capable of being 
ascertained by reference only to the general tariff con-
ditions and specific tariffs. Fare pricing rules are issued 
by the Governor-General under section 29A(l). They have 
not been issued, and there were never any such rules under 
any previous system. 
According to a spokeswoman in the Ministry67 it is not 
intended to issue any fare pricing rules as the Ministry 
considers all the factors it needs to implement have been 
included in the general tariff conditions. This is 
astonishing. The general tariff conditions only apply 
when included in a specific tariff. They do not provide 
for the calculation of a fare in the absence of a specific 
tariff. The Act specifically refers to 'fare pricing 
rules', and they are critical where there is no specific 
tariff issued for travel between two points. 
There could never be specific tariffs issued to govern 
travel between all locations in the world. To compile such 
a list would be an impossible task. Even when the intended 
three sets of specific tariffs are issued 68 they will only 
cover travel between a New Zealand airport and a specified 
overseas airport. Yet the Act controls not only carriage 
between New Zealand and any place outside New Zealand, but 
also carriage between places outside New Zealand, if that 
carriage is purchased, sold, or arranged in New Zealand.69 
It is submitted that without fare pricing rules, relevant 
tariffs cannot be calculated in the absence of a specific 
tariff. 
Commissions payable within the industry are controlled 
through sections 29A(6) and 29A(7). Under section 29A(6) 
the Minister may issue 'commission regimes', and by 
section 29A(7) it is provided that -
No person shall allow, charge, demand, 
disburse, give, offer, pay, provide, or 
retain, any agency commission otherwise 
than in accordance with every regime so 
issued and not revoked in its entirety. 
'Commission regime' and 'agency commission' are both 
extensively defined in section 29A(l2). The first 
commission regime was notified in the Gazette on 1 July 
1983.70 It was subsequently revoked and replaced by new 
commission regimes notified on 12 September 1983.71 It is 
apparent from the detail of the commission regime, and the 
definitions in section 29A(l2) that every imaginable way of 
arranging a commission has been dealt with. 
Sections 29A(l) and 29A(2) provide that the issuing of 
fare pricing rules, general tariff conditions and specific 
tariffs is to be for the purpose of giving effect to 
(a) Policies on external aviation from 
time to time promulgated by the 
Government of New Zealand; or 
(b) Any relevant international conven-
tion, agreement, or arrangement to 
which the Government of New Zealand 
is a party; or 
(c) Any relevant resolution or decision 
of [I.C.A.O] or of the [I.A.T.A.]. 
Section 29A(5) allows for a measure of flexibility in the 
promotion and sale of travel. Subject to approval, people 
may advertise and sell travel in anticipation of the issue 
of a relevant tariff, subject to the condition that it is 
not ultimately provided except in accordance with the 
issued relevant tariff. 
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Sections 29A(8) and 29A(9) require those in the industry to 
keep all records relating to international carriage by air 
for a period of two years from the date that all the 
international carriage by air to which they relate was 
completed. The Secretary, or persons authorised by him, 
may inspect or take copies of all these records. 
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By section lqA(lO) international carriage by air is deemed 
to be not in accordance with a relevant tariff if -
... there is allowed, given, offered, paid, 
or provided, in connection therewith, by 
or to any person whomsoever, any allow-
ance, bonus, discount, gift, payment, 
prize, rebate, reward, service, or other 
benefit whatsoever, -
(a) Not specified in that tariff; or 
(b) Otherwise than subject to the 
conditions, and in the circumstances, 
specified in that tariff in that 
behalf. 
The offence and penalty is provided by section 29A(ll). 
Every person who acts in contravention of or fails to comply 
with any provision of this section commits an offence and is 
liable to a fine not exceeding $5,000.00. There is no 
defence available such as was provided in Regulation 3(6) of 
the International Air Tariff Regulations 1978. Ignorance 
of the law is no longer an excuse. 
(2) The discounting techniques - all covered? 
Earlier in this Paper five methods of discounting air fares 
were outlined. It is now appropriate to examine whether 
the new system of tariff control has outlawed them. 
Clearly the direct offer of a cheaper fare is illegal. 
Section 29A(3) prohibits the selling of carriage not in 
accordance with the relevant tariff. Some methods of 
discounting are simple and others are complicated. All are 
potentially illegal. The problem with a complicated method 
is not its illegality, but in i.nvestigating and proving 
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the offence. In addition, the general tariff conditions 
provide a host of controls that may be included in a 
specific tariff. They control such matters as validity of 
tickets, group sizes, stopovers, baggage, children, refunds, 
cancellations, discounts for staff, possession of tickets, 
documentation, methods of payment, routing, etc. 
Paying the listed fare and receiving a refund later, apart 
from being an obvious attempt to avoid a relevant tariff, is 
covered by standard conditions 45 through to 52, if 
expressed to be included in the specific tariff. They pro-
vide that refunds are payable only in certain circumstances. 
Receiving extra benefits not specified in the relevant 
tariff is outlawed by section 29A(l0). As shown earlier 
the section deems international carriage by air not to be in 
accordance with a relevant tariff if there is -
... allowed, given, offered, paid, or 
provided, in connection therewith, by 
or to any person whomsoever, any allow-
ance, bonus, discount, gift, payment, 
prize, rebate, reward, service, or 
other benefit whatsoever, -
... Not specified in that tariff; ... 
Problems may arise in the interpretation of this subsection 
as the benefit becomes more remote from the air travel 
itself. To be illegal the subsection requires that the 
benefit be 'provided, in connection therewith' i.e. with the 
air travel. Clearly cheaper accommodation, increased levels 
of in-flight service (e.g: being upgraded to first class), 
free transport, and other benefits offered as an inducement 
to travel are in connection with the travel, but what of 
receiving a free 'lei' around the neck upon disembarkation? 
Although probably caught by the maxim de minimis non curat 
lex, such an attraction may well be in connection with the 
air travel since there is~'grey area' between leaving your 
flight phase at that desination, and beginning the next 
phase independent from the airline. 
Routing is covered by standard conditions 90 through 108, 
available for inclusion in specific tariffs. However, they 
can only apply where a specific tariff has been issued. 
What of the Fiji to Los Angeles fare offered by Air Pacific 
and mentioned earlier in this Paper? In the absence of a 
specific tariff, fare pricing rules are essential under the 
statute. In the absence of a fare pricing rule outlawing 
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a specific arrangement, that route cannot be illegal to 
sell. Section 29A(3) does not say international carriage by 
air must not be provided except in accordance with a rele-
vant tariff, it says 'the relevant tariff', indicating that 
unless there is a relevant tariff in force for a given 
route, carriage by air along that route is not prevented 
from being sold by the section. It is submitted that in the 
absence of fare pricing rules there is no relevant tariff 
in existence for routes not covered by specific tariffs, and 
accordingly their provision is not illegal under the present 
law. 
A traveller may go overseas and purchase a cheaper fare, but 
if there is a specific tariff in force for that route in New 
Zealand, it may not be pre-paid for by a Miscellaneous 
Charges Order in this country. M.C.O. 's are controlled by 
standard conditions 113 through 116, available for inclusion 
in specific tariffs. In the ab se nc e of a specific tar if f 
travel on the route may be sold, and M.C.O's issued, until 
fare pricing rules say otherwise. 
(3) The problems - are they solved? 
The Minister cited three major problems with the 1978 
Regulations. Commissions payable within the industry are 
now extensively controlled by the commission regimes 
referred to earlier, and the detail of those commission 
regimes appears to have provided for all contingencies. 
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To some extent the commission regimes will assist in areas 
where complex relationships between those involved in the 
industry have caused problems. However, in the opinion of 
the writer such problems could have been, and can be, solved 
by positive investigation and enforcement, it being not a 
problem with the law, but of gathering evidence. The same 
applies to problems of evidence mentioned. Provision is 
made for inspection of records under section 29A(8), and a 
system of investigation and enforcement is essential if the 
system is to be effective. 
It is unfortunate that the question of a complete and orga-
nised system of tariff promulgation was not addressed by the 
1982 amending Act. It is hoped that such a scheme may yet 
be introduced by the Ministry, beyond mere notification of 
tariffs and notices in the Gazette. 
The system is still not flexible enough. Recently cabinet 
approval was given to increase all international air fares 
by seven percent to offset the effects of devaluation. 
Rather than being able to issue a single notice providing 
for an across the board increase the Ministry has had to 
rewrite the complete list of specific tariffs to Europe. 
Approval had been given on 14 August 1984 and it was 
intended that all fares would rise from midnight that day. 
Many people purchasing travel on 15 August 1984 were charged 
the extra seven percent. Those travelling to Europe are 
entitled to a refund of that extra seven percent. Section 
29A(2) of the Act states -
... the Minister may from time to time, 
by notice in the Gazette, -
(a) Issue specific tariffs: 
(b) Amend or revoke any specific tariff 
so issued. 
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The wording of the section makes notification in the Gazette 
mandatory before a specific tariff can be issued, amended 
or revoked. Until the revised European specific tariffs are 
gazetted it is unlawful to charge more than the fare laid 
down in the existing specific tariff. 
C. The Effect on the Traveller 
Discounting may have an effect on the traveller concerned, 
under both civil and criminal law. 
( 1) C iv i 1 law 
According to the Minister there have been several instances 
in which passengers with illegally discounted tickets have 
been stranded and financially embarrassed at overseas air-
ports because airlines have refused to honour tickets.72 
It is submitted that in most cases it would be a breach of 
contract by the airline not to honour a ticket, whether or 
not it had been discounted. If the airline itself issued 
the ticket it would clearly be a breach of contract not to 
honour it. The position is not so clear where the ticket is 
issued by an agent. 
The general rule is that a contract made with a third party 
by an agent is just as enforceable against the principal as 
if the principal himself had made the contract. An 
important qualification, however, is that the principal is 
only liable for authorised acts of the agent. If the agent 
exceeds his authority the principal will not be liable for 
the excess. 
An airline may give an agent actual authority to discount, 
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in which case the airline will be bound by the arrangement.73 
Actual authority may be express or implied.74 In the 
absence of actual authority to discount, an apparent or 
ostensible agency may be as effective to bind the airline as 
an agency deliberately authorised. While, therefore, an 
airline cannot be bound as principal by a contract made 
without its authority, if the proved result of its conduct 
is that the travel agent appears to be the airline's agent, 
and makes a contract with a third party who relies on that 
appearance, the airline may be estopped from denying the 
existence of the authority.75 
If an airline normally discounts a particular fare through 
an agent, and does not advise the agent that such 
discounting is to stop, the airline will be bound to honour 
the ticket. 76 
Where an airline is bound to honour a ticket an action will 
generally lie against the airline only. The general rule is 
that if the agent is known to be an agent, and the contract 
is made for a named principal, the principal alone can be 
sued. 77 
If the travel agent was acting outside his authority such 
that the airline is not bound to honour the ticket then the 
liability of the agent will depend upon his state of belief. 
If the agent knew he had no authority to discount the ticket 
then an action will lie against the agent in the tort of 
deceit.78 An innocent mistake will not render the agent 
liable in deceit, but it is submitted that a discounted fare 
would rarely be an innocent mistake. 
(2) Criminal law 
Like the legislation before it, the 1982 amending Act makes 
no specific mention of the traveller committing an offence, 
and it is submitted that under the wording of the Act a 
traveller does not commit a breach of its provisions by 
accepting travel not in accordance with a relevant tariff. 
To infringe section 29A(3) the 'person' must be a travel 
organiser. Nowhere in the Act is the 'acceptance' of 
anything prohibited. 
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An innocent traveller will therefore commit no wrong. But 
it is submitted that a traveller who suggests, knowingly 
accepts, conspires, or in any other way takes an active part 
in an illegal discounting arrangement will commit an offence 
against section 66 of the Crimes Act 1961, and thereby 
become a party to the offence liable to the same punishment 
as the principa1.79 
CONCLUSION 
The new system, as provided by the 1982 amending Act, has 
now been in force for over a year, and it is submitted that 
it has had little effect on the international travel 
industry. The system is cumbersome and complex. The 
problem is revealed in a surprisingly frank admission 
contained in the explanatory note to the General Passenger 
Tariff Conditions Order - 80 
The provisions of this order, taken 
together, are neither comprehensive nor 
coherent ...• 
41 
The law, as in any situation, will only be respected if it 
is clear, and is being effectively controlled and policed. 
To be clear it is submitted that an efficient system of 
tariff promulgation is required. In 1983 many travel agents 
paid $228.20 each for a folder and subscription service to 
the forthcoming regulations, notices and orders. It was 
the most expensive item sold by the Government Bookshop. As 
yet this service has not been provided. Such a service 
should be provided. It must be comprehensive and flexible. 
Tariffs should be regularly updated, and all changes 
advised. 
For the law to be respected, gaps in the legislation, such 
as the absence of fare pricing rules, must be remedied. 
The Ministry should provide a staff of full-time investigators 
to police the provisions of the Act. The investigators 
should have accounting and travel industry experience. 
Airlines and other travel organisers' records should be 
regularly inspected under section 29A(8) with a view to 
bringing prosecutions if evidence of illegal discounting is 
discovered. Test tickets should be purchased to catch 
discounters who falsify records or documents. No matter how 
much faith an airline has in the system it may still wish to 
discount to undercut a competitor. Perhaps stronger sane-
tions, such as imprisonment for serious offending, should be 
introduced as a more effective deterrent. Random checks on 
tickets should be made at airports to ensure correct fares 
have been paid. That such investigation should be the 
responsibility of the Ministry is shown by the failure of a 
private policing scheme in early 1984.81 
There have been no prosecutions to date. This, in a system 
that was introduced to clean up the law, is astonishing. 
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The legislation has provided for an effective system, but it 
is not working in practice. The legislation has so far 
imposed a large financial burden on the industry. Many 
airlines and travel agents have spent thousands of dollars 
on legal fees in trying to interpret and understand the 
subordinate legislation mentioned in this Paper. In return 
for this the industry is entitled to an effective system of 
tariff approval and enforcement. The costs so far have only 
added to the costs of discounting. 
If the system is not working soon it is submitted that the 
industry may lose patience and call for deregulation. Some 
travel agents are already demanding that the law be either 
properly enforced or withdrawn.82 If the industry is 
deregulated competition may become cut-throat. Revenues 
will fall and so, therefore, will safety standards. New 
Zealand's external civil aviation policy goals will not be 
met, and bilateral agreements may have to be re-negotiated. 




App. J. H. R. Appendices to the Journals of the House of 
Representatives, New Zealand. 
N.Z.T.S. New Zealand Treaty Series. Wellington. 
Department of External Affairs. 
U.K. Misc. British Parliamentary Papers. Command Papers. 
Miscellaneous Series. London, H.M. Stationery 
Office. 
U.K.T.S. British Parliamentary Papers. Command Papers. 
Treaty Series. London, H.M. Stationery Office. 
U.N.T.S. United Nations Treaty Series. (Treaties and 
International Agreements Registered or Filed 
and Recorded with the Secretariat of the 
United Nations). 
1. N.Z. Parliamentary debates Vol. 448, 1982: 4625. 








Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and the 
Government of the Republic of Nauru Concerning Air 
Services, Wellington, 5 August 1980. N.Z.T.S. 1980, No. 
10; App.J.H.R., Vol.l, 1982, A.27. 
External Civil Aviation Policy of New Zealand, 
Parliament. House of Rep re sen ta tives. App. J. H. R., vol. i, 
19 7 9 , H. 3 : 6 . 
Ibid . 19. 
For example, during the Falkland Islands conflict in 
1982 landing and operating rights at Auckland 
International Airport were withdrawn from Aerolineas 
Argent inas. 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, 7 
December 1944. App.J.H.R., vol.l, 1945, A.9; U.K. 
Mi s c . No • 6 ; ( 19 4 5 ; Cmd 6 614 ) ; 8 4 U • N • T . S . 3 8 9 . 
External Civil Aviation Policy of New Zealand, op.cit., 
supra n.4, 6. 
Ibid. 7. 
44 
10. Agreement between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the United Kingdom 
Relating to Air Se rv ices between their Re spec tiv e 
Territories, Bermuda, 11 February 1946, 3 U.N.T.S. 253. 
11. External Civil Aviation Policy of New Zealand, op.cit., 
supra n.4, 22. 
12. It is interesting to note that Air Florida was a major 
proponent of deregulation. When this occurred in the 
United States in 1978 Air Florida expanded its 
operation, offering more routes, increased frequencies, 
and cheaper fares. On 4 July 1984 Air Florida filed 
for bankruptcy, with large debts, and a great loss of 
employment. (Television New Zealand News, 5 July 
19 8 4) . 
13. External Civil Aviation Policy of New Zealand, op.cit., 
supra n.4, 23. 
14. External Civil Aviation Policy of New Zealand, 
Parliament. House of Representatives. App.J.H.R., 
vol.8, 1979, H.3. 
15. See Agreement between New Zealand and Japan for Air 
Services, Auckland, 18 January 1980 (in force 18 June 
1980). N.Z.T.S. 1980, No. 7; App.J.H.R., vol.l, 1982, 
A. 24, a rt ic le 11; Agreement between New Zealand and the 
Kingdom of Tonga Concerning Air Services, Wellington, 
26 November 1980, N.Z.T.S. 1980, No. 12; App.J.H.R., 
vol.l, 1982, A.29, article 9; Agreement between the 
Government of New Zealand and the Government of the 
Republic of Nauru Concerning Air Services, op.cit., 
supra n.3, article 10. 
16. N.Z. Parliamentary debates Vol. 448, 1982: 4629. 
17. Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, 
Chicago, 7 December 1944. App.J.H.R., vol.l, 1945, 
A.9; U.K. Misc. No. 6, (1945; Cmd. 6614); 171 U.N.T.S. 
345; Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
Chicago, 7 December 1944. App.J.H.R., vol. 1, 1945, 
A.9; U.K. Misc No.6, (1945; Cmd. 6614); 84 U.N.T.S. 389; 
Interim Air Services Transit Agreement, Chicago, 7 
December 1944. App.J.H.R., vol.l, 1945, A.9; Protocol 
Amending the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation, Montreal, 27 May 1947. U.K. Misc. No 11, 
(1947; Cmd. 7202); 418 U.N.T.S. 161; Protocol Relating 
to an Amendment to the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation, Montreal, 14 June 1954. U.K.T.S. No. 
24, (1958; Cmnd. 482); 320 U.N.T.S. 209; Protocol 
Relating to Certain Amendments to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, Montreal, 14 June 1954. 
U . K . T. S . No . 2 6 , ( 19 5 7 ; Cmnd . 10 7 ) ; 3 2 0 U. N. T. S . 21 7 . 
45 
18. External Civil Aviation Policy of New Zealand, op.cit., 
supra n.14, 32. 
19. Ibid. 41. 
20. For example the following factors are not mentioned 
(apart from the possibility that they will be 
considered under 'all relevant factors'): safety and 
security in international air transportation; market 
expansion and increase of demand; unjust 
discrimination, preference or advantage. 
21. Referred to in this Paper as 'the Minister'. In both 
the then National Government and the present Labour 
Government offices of Minister of Civil Aviation and 
Meteorological Services, and Minister of Transport 
are held by the same person. 
22. N.Z. Parliamentary debates Vol. 448, 1982: 4625. 
23. Idem. 
24. The effect of discounting on the traveller, under both 
civil and criminal law, is the subject of discussion in 
Part 4.C. of this Paper. 
25. N.Z. Parliamentary debates Vol. 448, 1982: 4629. 
26. Ibid . 4 6 27. 
27. Idem. 
28. National Business Review, Wellington, New Zealand, Vol. 
15, No. 2, 30 January 1984, p.6. 
29. Idem. 
30. Idem. 
31. National Business Review, op.cit., Vol. 15, No.l, 23 
January 1984, p.31. 
32. Idem. 
33. N.Z. Parliamentary debates Vol. 448, 1982: 4626. 
34. Sectionl6(4). 
35. Section 16 (5) . 
36. Per Mr. J. Kennedy-Good, Controller of Air Services 
Policy, Ministry of Transport, Interview with writer, 4 
April 1984. 
46 
37. Section 4 (1). 
38. Section 4(1),(2). 
39. Section4(4). 
40. N.Z. Parliamentary debates Vol. 448, 1982: 4625. 
41. Section 29. 
42. New Zealand Gazette, 26 January 1978, No. 4, p. 170. 
43. Regulation 1(2). 
44. Regulation 4(2). 
45. Regulation 4(4). 
46. Regulation 4 (5), (6). 
47. This problem is the subject of later discussion in this 



















Vol. 4 48, 1982; 4625. 
Vol. 443, 1982: 215. 
Vol. 448, 1982: 4625. 
54. This Act was introduced to Parliament in 1982 as the 
Civil Aviation Amendment Bill (No. 2). It should be 
noted that the first Civil Aviation Amendment Bill of 
that year dealt with certain domestic matters and was 
not relevant to international civil aviation, although 
the matter was briefly referred to during the first 
reading (N.Z. Parliamentary debates Vol. 443, 1982: 
214, 215, 217). That first Bill was held over to the 
1983 session, held over again to the 1984 session, and 
subsequently lapsed upon the dissolution of Parliament 
on 15 June 1984. 
55. Section2(4). 
56. Section 2(3). 
47 
57. Interview with writer, 4 April 1984. 
58. External Civil Aviation Policy of New Zealand, op.cit., 
supra n.13, 24. 
59. N.Z. Parliamentary debates Vol. 448, 1982: 4628. 
60. Supra, n.36. 
61. Review of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1953, 
Amendment No. 22 (S.R. 1979/18) - Report of the Statutes 
Revision Committee Pursuant to Standing Order 377, 24 
July 1980. App.J.H.R., vol.5, 1980, IS:17. 
62. The First Class Special Round Trip Tariff from Auckland, 
Christchurch, or Wellington to London Notice 1983. New 
Zealand Gazette, 30 September 1983, No. 163, p.3309. 
63. The Economy Special Round Trip Tariff from New Zealand 
to Australia Notice 1983, New Zealand Gazette, 14 
October 1983, No. 169, p. 3441. 
64. International Air Tariffs, Normal First and Economy 
Class Air Fares between New Zealand and Europe. New 
Zealand Gazette, 14 June 1984, No. 96, p.1907. 
65. At the time of writing two more volumes were stated by 
the Ministry to be only a few weeks away from being 
issued. 
66. The Civil Aviation (General Passenger Tariff 
Conditions) Order 1984. New Zealand Gazette, 30 March 
1984, No. 51, p. 1019. 
67. Interview with writer, 23 July 1984. 
68. Supra n.65. 
69. Section 29A(l2), 'International carriage by air'. 
70. Civil Aviation (Agents' Commission Regime) Notice 1983, 
New Zealand Gazette, 1 July 1983, No.95, p.2067. 
71. The Civil Aviation (Passenger Agents' Commission 
Regime) Notice 1983. New Zealand Gazette, 12 
September 1983, No. 146, p.3043. 
72. N.Z. Parliamentary debates Vol. 448, 1982: 4625. 
73. Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties 
(Mangal) Ltd. [1964] 2 Q.B. 480,502; [1964] l All ER 
630,644. 
74. Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd. [1968] 1 Q.B.549, 583; 
[1967] 3 All ER 98,102. 
48 
75. J.F. Northey (ed.), Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract 
(5 ed., Butterworths, Wellington, 1979), p.392. 
76. Debenham v Mellon (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 394, 403. 
77. Montgomerie v United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Association 
Ltd. [1891] 1 Q.B. 370,371. 
78. Polhill v Walter (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 114. 
79. Section 66 reads -
(1) Every one is a party to and guilty of an 
offence who -
(a) Actually commits the offence; or 
(b) Does or omits an act for the purpose 
of aiding any person to commit the 
offence; or 
(c) Abets any person in the commission of 
the offence; or 
(d) Incites, counsels, or procures any 
person to commit the offence. 
(2) Where 2 or more persons form a common 
intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, 
and to assist each other therein, each of 
them is a party to every offence committed 
by any one of them in the prosecution of the 
common purpose if the commission of that 
offence was known to be a probable 
consequence of the prosecution of the common 
purpose. 
8 0 . Supra , n . 6 6 . 
81. National Business Review, op. cit., Vol.15, No. 
1, 23 January 1984, pp. 1,3. 
82. The Dominion, Wellington, 14 August 1984, p.l. 
A P P E N D I X 
Agreement betweeen the Government of New 
Zealand and the Government of the Republic 
of Nauru Concerning Air Services. 
49 
New Zealand Treaty Series 1980, No. 10 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
AGREEMENT 
A. 27 
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
NAURU CONCERNING AIR SERVICES 
Wellington, 5 August 1980 
(in force 5 August 1980) 
Presented to the House of Representatives by Leave 
BY AUTHORITY: 
P. D. HASSELBEllG, GOVERNMENT PllIIITEJl, WEU.INGTON, NEW ZEALAND-1982 
Priu 75c. 
A. 27 2 
AGREEMENT BE1WEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEA-LAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU CONCERNING AIR SERVICES 
The Government of New Zealand and the Government of the Republic of Nauru (hereinafter referred to as "the Contracting Parties"); BEING PARTIES to the Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature at Chicago on the seventh day of December 1944; DESIRING to conclude an Agreement, supplementary to the said Convention, for the purpose of establishing air services between their respective territories 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Definitions 
1. For the purposes of this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires: 
(a) the term "the Convention" means the Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Chicago on the seventh of December 1944 and includes any Annex adopted under Article 90 of that Convention and any amendment of the Annexes or Convention under Articles 90 and 94 thereof so far as those Annexes and amendments have become effective for or been ratified by both Contracting Parties; 
(b) the term "aeronautical authorities" means, in the case of New Zealand the Minister for the time being responsible for civil aviation and in the case of Nauru the Civil Aviation Authority and in either case includes any person or body authorised to perform any functions at present exercisable by him or by it or similar functions; 
(c) the term "designated airline" means an airline which has been designated and authorised in accordance with Article IV of this Agreement; 
(d) the term "territory" in relation to a state means the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, of that State and in the case of New Zealand also includes the Cook Islands and Tokelau; 
( e) the term "air service", "international air service", "airline" and "stop for non-traffic purposes" have the meanings respectively assigned to them in Article 96 of the Convention. 2. The Schedule to this Agreement (hereinafter called "the Schedule") forms an integral part of this Agreement and all references to this Agreement shall be deemed to include references to the Schedule. 
ARTICLE II 
Chicago Convention and other Conventions 
The provisions of this Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Convention and to the provisions of any other multilateral convention that is binding on both Contracting Parties in so far as those provisions are applicable to international air services. 
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ARTICLE III 
Grant of Rights 
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I. Each Contracting Party grants to the other Contracting Party the 
following rights in respect of its scheduled international air services: 
(a) the right to fly across its territory without landing; 
(b) the right to make stops in its territory for non-traffic purposes. 
2. Each Contracting Party grants to the other Contracting Party the 
rights specified in this agreement for the purpose of establishing scheduled 
international air services on the routes specified in the appropriate Section· 
of the Schedule annexed to this Agreement. Such services and routes are 
hereinafter called "the agreed services" and "the specified routes" 
respectively. While. operating an agreed service on a specified route the 
airline designated by each Contracting Party shall enjoy in addition to the 
rights specified in paragraph I of this Article the right to make stops in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party at the points specified for that 
route in the Schedule to this Agreement for the purpose of taking on board 
and discharging passengers and cargo including mail, separately or in 
combination. 
3. Nothing in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be deemed to confer on 
the airline of one Contracting Party the privilege of taking on board, in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party, passengers and cargo including 
mail carried for hire or reward to be set down at another point in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party. 
ARTICLE IV 
Designation of Airlines 
l. Each Contracting Party shall have the right to designate in writing 
through the diplomatic channel to the other Contracting Party an airline 
for the purpose of operating the agreed services on the specified routes. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall have the right, on notification in 
writing to the other Contracting Party, to withdraw its designation of an 
airline and to designate another airline in its place. 
3. On receipt of a designation the other Contracting Party shall, subject 
to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, without delay grant 
to the airline designated the appropriate operating authorisation. 
4. The aeronautical authorities of one Contracting Party may require 
an airline designated by the other Contracting Party to satisfy them that it 
is qualified to fuliil the conditions prescribed under the laws and 
regulations normally and reasonably applied to the operation of 
international air services by such authorities in conformity with the 
provisions of the Convention. 
5. Each Contracting Party shall have the right to refuse to grant the 
operating authorisations referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, or to 
impose such conditions as it may deem necessary on the exercise by a 
designated airline of the rights specified in Article III of this Agreement, 
in any case where the said Contracting Party is not satisfied that 
substantial ownership and effective control of that airline are vested in the 
Contracting Party designating the airline or in its nationals. 
6. When an airline has been so designated and authorised it l'Jlay at any 
time operate the agreed services, provided that a tariff established in 
accordance with the provisions of Article X of this Agreement is in force in 
respect of that service. 
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ARTICLE V 
Revocation or Suspension of Operating Authorisations 
I. Each Contracting Party shall have the right to revoke an operating 
authorisation or to suspend the exercise of the rights specified in Article 
III of this Agreement by an airline designated by the other Contracting 
Party, or to impose such conditions as it may deem necessary on the 
exercise of these rights-
( a) in any case where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and 
effective control of that airline are vested in the Contracting 
Party designating the airline or in nationals of that Contracting 
Party; or 
(b) in the case of failure by that airline to comply with the laws or 
regulations of the Contracting Party granting these rights; or 
(c) in a case where the airline otherwise fails to operate in accordance 
with the conditions prescribed under this Agreement. 
2. Unless immediate revocation, suspension or imposition of the 
conditions mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article is essential to prevent 
further infringements of laws or regulations, such right shall be exercised 
only after consultation with the other Contracting Party. 
ARTICLE VI 
Customs Regulations 
1. Aircraft of the designated airline of one Contracting Party operating 
international air services, and the supplies of regular equipment, fuel, 
lubricating oils, and aircraft stores (including provisions of food, drink 
and tobacco) on board such aircraft, shall be exempted on arrival in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party from all customs duty, inspection 
fees, and other similar duties and charges, provided that such supplies 
either: 
(a) remain on board the aircraft concerned until departure from the 
territory of the latter Contracting Party or are used on the part of 
the journey performed over that territory; or 
(b) are unloaded from the aircraft with the permission of the 
appropriate customs authorities, pursuant to the provisions of 
paragraph 3 of this Article. 
2. The same exemption from duties and charges, save in respect of 
reasonable charges made for services rendered, shall apply to: 
(a) aircraft stores, of whatever origin, obtained in the territory of one 
Contracting Party within the limits permitted by relevant laws 
and regulations of that Contracting Party, and taken on board 
aircraft of the other Contracting Party operating an 
international air service; 
(b) spare parts imported into the territory of one Contracting Party for 
the maintenance or repair of aircraft of the other Contracting 
Party operating an international air service; 
( c) fuel and lubricating oils obtained in the territory of one Contracting 
Party and_ intended for fuelling aircraft of the other Contracting 
Party operating an international air service, even though such 
supplies are to be used on that part of the flight which passes 
over the territory of the Contracting Party in whose territory 
they were taken on board; 
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(d) at the discretion of the customs authorities, equipment (including 
specialised ground equipment), intended for incorporation in or 
use on aircraft of a designated airline of the other Contracting 
Party engaged on an international air service, or for use solely in 
connection with the operation or servicing of such aircraft . 
3. Supplies of regular equipment and aircraft stores referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article may not be unloaded except with the 
permission of the customs authorities of the Contracting Party concerned . 
If this permission has been granted, the supplies shall be stored in 
accordance with the directions of the customs authorities pending re-
exportation or compliance with normal customs procedures. 
ARTICLE VII 
Transfer of Earnings 
Each Contracting Party grants to the designated airline of the other 
Contracting Party the right of free transfer of the excess of their receipts in 
its territory over their expenditure therein. Such transfers shall be effected 
on the basis of the prevailing foreign exchange market rates for current 
payments. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Principles Governing Operation of Agreed Services 
I. There shall be fair and equal opportunity for the designated airline of 
each Contracting Party to operate the agreed services on the specified 
routes between their respective territories. 
2. In operating services on any specified route the designated airline of 
each Contracting Party shall take into account the interests of the 
designated airline of the other Contracting Party so as not to affect unduly 
the services which the latter provides on the whole or part of the same 
route. 
3. The agreed services provided by the designated airline of each 
Contracting Party shall bear close relationship to the requirements of the 
public for transportation on the specified routes and shall have as their 
primary objective the provision, at a reasonable load factor, of capacity 
adequate to carry the current and reasonably anticipated requirements for 
the carriage of passengers and cargo including mail originating from or 
destined for the territory of the Contracting Party which has designated 
the airline. Provision for the carriage of passengers and cargo including 
mail originating from and destined for points on the specified routes in the 
territories of States other than that designating the airline shall be made in 
accordance with the general principles that capacity shall be related to : 
(a) traffic requirements to and from the territory of the Contracting 
Party which has designated the airline; 
(b) traffic requirements of the area through which the agreed service 
passes, after taking account of local and regional services; 
(c) the requirements of through airline operation. 
ARTICLE IX 
Change of Gauge 
In operating any agreed service on any specified route a designated 
airline of one Contracting Party may substitute one aircraft for another at 
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a point in the territory of the other Contracting Party on the following 
conditions only: 
(a) that it is justified by reason of economy of operation; 
(b) that the aircraft used on the seC\ion of the route more distant from 
the terminal in the territory of the first Contracting Party is not 
larger in capacity than that used on the nearer section; 
(c) that the aircraft used on the more distant section shall operate only 
in connection with and as an extension of the service provided by 
the aircraft used on the nearer section and shall be scheduled so 
to do; the former shall arrive at the point of change for the 
purpose of carrying traffic transferred from, or to be transferred 
into, the aircraft used on the nearer section; and its capacity 
shall be determined with primary reference to this purpose; 
(d) that there is an adequate volume of through traffic; 
( e) that> the airline shall Hot hold itself out to the public by 
advertisement or otherwise as providing a service which 
originates at a point wh·ere the change of aircraft is made; 
(f) that the provisions of Article VIII of this Agreement shall govern all 
arrangements made with regard to change of aircraft; 
(g) that in connection with any one aircraft flight into the territory in 
which the change of aircraft is made, only one flight may be 
made out of that territory. 
ARTICLE X 
Tariffs 
1. For the purposes of the following paragraphs the term "tariff" means 
the prices to be paid for the carriage of passengers and cargo and the 
conditions under which these prices apply, including prices and 
conditions for agency and other auxiliary services excluding remuneration 
and conditions for the carriage of mail; the term "designated airline 
concerned" means a designated airline currently operating, or proposing 
· to operate, on the routes covered by a tariff. 
2. The tariffs on any agreed service shall be established at reasonable 
levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors including cost of 
operation, reasonable profit, characteristics of the service (such as 
standards of speed and accommodation) and the tariffs of other airlines . 
3. Such tariffs shall be submitted for the approval of the aeronautical 
authorities of both Contracting Parties at least sixty (60) days before the 
proposed date of their introduction. In special cases this period may be 
reduced, subject to the agreement of the said authorities . This approval 
may be given expressly. If neither of the aeronautical authorities has 
expressed disapproval within thirty (30) days from the date of submission 
of a tariff in accordance with this paragraph, the tariff shall be considered 
as approved. In the event of the period for submission being reduced, as 
provided for in this paragraph, the aeronautical authorities may agree 
that the period within which any disapproval may be notified shall be less 
than thirty (30) days . 
4 . The tariffs referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall, whenever 
possible, be agreed by the designated airlines concerned. In all cases the 
agreed tariffs shall be subject to the approval of the aeronautical 
authorities of both Contracting Parties who shall have due regard to the 
provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article . 
7 A. 27 
5. If the designated airline or airlines concerned cannot agree on the 
appropriate tariffs, or if the aeronautical authorities of either Contracting 
Party do not approve the tariffs submitted to them in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article, the aeronautical authoritie~ of 
the Contracting Parties shall endeavour to determine the tariffs according 
to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article by agreement between 
themselves. 
6. If the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting Parties cannot 
agree on the determination of any tariff under paragraph 5 of this Article, 
the dispute shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of Article 
XIII of this Agreement. 
7. No new or amended tariff shall come into effect unless and until it is 
approved by the aeronautical authorities of both Contracting Parties or is 
settled in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of this 
Agreement. 
8. When tariffs have been established in accordance with the provisions 
of this article, these tariffs shall remain in force until new tariffs have been 
established in accordance with the provisions of this Article. Nevertheless, 
a tariff shall not be prolonged by virtue of this paragraph for more than 
twelve ( 12) months after the date on which one Contracting Party shall 
have given notice in writing to the other Contracting Party of its intention 
to withdraw its approval. 
9. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties each Contracting Party 
undertakes to use its best efforts to ensure that any tariff specified in terms 
of its national currency will be established in an amount which reflects the 
effective exchange rate (including all exchange fees or other charges) at 
which the designated airline of each Contracting Party can convert and 
remit the reserves from their transport operations into the national 
currency of the other Contracting Party. 
ARTICLE XI 
Provision of Statistics 
The aeronautical authorities of a Contracting Party shall supply to the 
aeronautical authorities of the other Contracting Party at their request 
such periodic or other statements of statistics as may be reasonably 
required for the purpose of reviewing the capacity provided on the agreed 
services by a designated airline of the Contracting Party referred to first in 
this Article. Such statements shall include all information required to 
determine the amount of traffic carried by the airline on the agreed 
services and the origins and destinations of such traffic. 
ARTICLE XII 
Consultation 
l. In a spirit of close co-operation, the aeronautical authorities of the 
Contracting Parties shall consult each other from time to time with a view 
to ensuring the implementation of, and satisfactory compliance with, the 
provisions of this Agreement and shall consult when necessary to provide 
for modification thereof. 
2. Either Contracting Party may request consultations which may be 
either oral or in writing and shall begin within a period of sixty (60) days 
of the date of receipt of the request, unless both Contracting Parties agree 
to an extension of this period. 
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ARTICLE XIII 
Settlement of Disputes 
1. If any dispute arises between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation or application of this Agreement, the Contracting Parties 
shall in the first place endeavour to settle it by negotiation. 
2. If the Contracting Parties fail to reach a settlement by negotiation, 
they may agree to refer the dispute for decision to some person or body; if 
they do not so agree, the dispute shall at the request of either Contracting 
Party be submitted for decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be 
nominated by each Contracting Party and the third to be appointed by 
the two so nominated. Each of the Contracting Parties shall nominate an 
arbitrator within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt by 
either Contracting Party from the other of a notice through diplomatic 
channels requesting arbitration of the dispute by such a tribunal, and the 
third arbitrator shall be appointed within a further period of sixty (60) 
days . If either of the Contracting Parties fails to nominate an arbitrator 
within the period specified, or if the third arbitrator is not appointed 
within the period specified, the President of the Council of the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation may at the request of either 
Contracting Party appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators as the case 
requires. In such case, the third arbitrator shall be a national of a third 
State and shall act as President of the arbitral tribunal. 
3. The Contracting Parties shall comply with any decision given under 
paragraph 2 of this Article. 
4. The expenses of the national arbitrators shall be borne by the 
respective Contracting Parties. All other expenses of the arbitral tribunal, 
including the fees and expenses of the third arbitrator, shall be shared 
equally by the Contracting Parties. 
ARTICLE XIV 
Amendment 
If either of the Contracting Parties considers it desirable to modify any 
provision of this Agreement including the annexed Schedule, such 
modification, if agreed between the Contracting Parties and if necessary 
after consultation in accordance with Article XII of this Agreement, shall 




Either Contracting Party may at any time give notice to the other 
Contracting Party of its decision to terminate this Agreement; such notice 
shall be simultaneously communicated to the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation. In such case the Agreement shall terminate twelve ( 12) 
months after the date of receipt of the notice by the other Contracting 
Party, unless the notice to terminate is withdrawn by agreement before 
the expiry of this period . In the absence of acknowledgment of receipt by 
the other Contracting Party, notice shall be deemed to have been received 
fourteen ( 14) days after the receipt of the no tice by the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation . 
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ARTICLE XVI 
Entry into Force 
A. 27 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the signature. 
h WIT!XESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by 
their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement. 
DONE in duplicate at Wellington this 5th day of August 1980 in the 
English language. 
HAMMER DEROBCRT 
For the Government of 
the Republic of Nauru 
LANCE R. ADAMS-SCHNIEDI.:R 
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Note: Points on the routes set out in Sections l and 2 of this Schedule 
may be omitted on any or all flights provided that each service begins or 
ends in the territory of the Contracting Party designating the airline in 
question. 
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